Heidegger's Linguistics, E-book, do posegregowania
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Inquiry
,45,205–16
Symposium:CristinaLafont,
Heidegger,Language,andWorld-disclosure
*
WasHeideggeraLinguisticIdealist?
TaylorCarman
BarnardCollege,ColumbiaUniversity
CristinaLafont’sfascinatingbook,originallypublishedinGermaneight
yearsago,nowrevisedandtranslatedintoEnglish,makesanimportant
contributiontoHeideggerscholarship,bothinitssensitivitytothehistorical
sourcesinformingHeidegger’sre
�
ectionsonlanguageandinthewayit
drawsHeideggerintorecentdebatesaboutmeaninginAnglo-American
philosophy.AnyoneinterestedinHeidegger,andespeciallyanyonenot
alreadyconvincedofhisrelevancetocontemporarytheoriesofmindand
language,shouldreadit.Moreover,quiteapartfromitspurelyphilosophical
value,thebookisitselfgoodevidencethattheterms‘continental’and
‘analytic’havenotjustoutlivedtheirusefulness,buthaveforalongtime
beenfunctioningasideologicalobstaclestointerculturalscholarshipand
creativedialoguebetweenphilosophicalstylesandtraditions.
Heidegger,
Language,andWorld-disclosure
exhibitsanadmirabledisregardforthose
stultifyingcategories.
Nevertheless,I
Ž
ndmyselfindisagreementwithmostofwhatLafontsays
aboutHeidegger’saccountofmeaningandpracticein
BeingandTime
andits
supposedlydireepistemologicalconsequences.Lafontargues,inshort,(1)
thatthediscussionofsignsin§17of
BeingandTime
implies,andindeed
Heideggerbelieves,thatallworldlyintelligibilityislinguisticallyconstituted,
or‘symbolicallystructured’(pp.11,15,29,
passim
);(2)thatHeidegger
equivocatesbetweentwoincompatibleaccountsofthatintelligibility:one
‘factical’andholistic,theothertranscendentaland(implicitly)subjectivist;
(3)thatheshareswithFregeandHusserl(
interalios
)theassumptionthat
semanticmeaningdeterminesreference;(4)thathemustthereforedenythat
ournormativeunderstandingofentitiesisrevisableinlightofexperience;and
(5)thatinternalismentailsidealism.Thatsequenceofpropositionsroughly
describesthelogicalorderofLafont’sargument,butitalsochartswhat
strikesmeasitsgraduallydiminishingstagesofimplausibility.Thatistosay,
*CristinaLafont,
Heidegger,Language,andWorld-disclosure
,trans.GrahamHarman
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),originallypublishedas
Spracheund
Welterschliessung:ZurlinguistischenWendederHermeneutikHeideggers
(Frankfurtam
Main:Suhrkamp,1994).AllunprefixedpagereferencesaretotheEnglishtranslation.
#
2002Taylor&Francis
206
TaylorCarman
Iamcon
Ž
dentthat(1)isfalse,I’mcomfortablycertainthat(2)isnottrue,I’m
reasonablysurethat(3)iswrong,I’mdoubtfulabout(4),andIremain
unconvincedof(5).Sincespaceislimited,however,Ishallrestrictmyselfto
the
Ž
rstthreepointsandleavethelasttwotoothers,ortoanotheroccasion.
ItiscrucialforthesuccessofLafont’sargumentthatsheestablishearlyon
thatthehermeneuticphenomenologyof
BeingandTime
belongedtothe
‘linguisticturn’inGermanphilosophyinitiatedbyHamann,Herder,and
Humboldtmorethanacenturyearlier.Throughouthiscareer,longbeforethe
muchstronger,moreexplicitclaimshewouldlatermakeconcerningthe
constitutiveroleoflanguageinourunderstandingofbeing,accordingto
Lafont,Heideggeralreadyregardedmeaningandunderstandingasessentially
linguisticphenomena.ForHeidegger,shewrites,‘thearticulationof
intelligibilitycan“haveaspeci
Ž
callyworldlykindofbeing”
onlyin
language
’(p.73).Iwanttoemphasizethatthisthesisisthekeypremiseon
whichtheargumentoftheentirebookrests.Ifthepremiseisfalse,muchof
thesubsequentdiscussion,particularlywithregardtopost-Fregeantheories
ofsenseandreferenceinAnglo-Americanphilosophy,willloseitsrelevance
totheaccountofmeaningandunderstandingin
BeingandTime.
AndIthinkthepremiseisfalse.Ialsothink,therefore,thatLafont’s
argumentlargelyfails.Ibelievesheisright,however,thatHeidegger
remainedcommittedtoakindofontologicalapriorism,inspiteofhis
realizationthathumanunderstandingisalwaysessentially‘factical’,whichis
tosaydependentontheonticallyconcrete,historicallycontingentworldwe
Ž
ndourselvesthrowninto.ButapriorismisnotthesameasFregeanism,andit
seemstomeHeideggercouldhaveconsistentlyheldalessrigidconceptionof
theontologicalaprioribywayofaccommodatingthemanyanti-Fregeanand
anti-Husserlianthingshedoessayabouttheconcreteworldlyconditionsof
intentionality,meaning,andlinguisticpractice.Lafontcon
�
atesthe
distinctionbetweenaprioriandaposterioriwiththatbetweenmeaningand
reference;indeed,shecon
�
atesbothwithathirddistinctionbetweensubject
andobject.Allthreeshouldbekeptseparate.Notallmeaningisontological,
someisontic,andHeideggerisadamantindenyingthatDaseinisanything
likeaconstitutingsubjectstandingoveragainsttheworldasaconstituted
object.Ashesays,‘subjectandobjectdonotcoincidewithDaseinand
world’.
1
Lafont’sargumentforthecentralityoflanguageinHeidegger’saccountof
intelligibilityrestsonthefascinatingifsomewhatsketchystoryhetellsabout
thepragmaticfunctionofsignsin§17of
BeingandTime.
Theargumentin
§17isthatsignsarenot,ontologicallyspeaking,‘occurrent’(
vorhanden
)
entitiesstandinginobjectiverelationstootheroccurrententitiesthankstothe
mentalactsorsubjectiveinterpretationsoftheirusers.Theyareinsteadakind
of‘equipment’(
Zeug
)whosebeingistobe‘available’(
zuhanden
)foruse.
Butsignsarepeculiar,forwhileequipmentgenerallyremainsinconspic-
WasHeideggeraLinguisticIdealist?
207
uous,sothatourconcerncandwellonthetaskathand,signsfunction
preciselybystandingoutexplicitlytorevealor‘show’(
zeigen
)something.In
thisway,‘Inourconcernfuldealings,equipmentforshowing[
Zeig-zeug
]gets
usedina
special
[
vorzu¨glich
]way’(
SZ
79).Signsareequipment,butwhereas
equipmenttypicallyrecedesintothebackground,signsfunctionbybeing
conspicuous.Thesigndoesnotjust
Ž
tneatlyintoaninterlockingnexusof
equipment;itorganizesoursenseofthesituationasawhole:
Thiscircumspectiveoverviewdoesnotgraspwhatisavailable;whatitachievesis
ratheranorientationinourenvironment....Signsofthekindwehavedescribedlet
whatisavailablebeencountered;moreprecisely,theyletsomecontextofitbecome
accessibleinsuchawaythatourconcernfuldealingstakeonanorientationandholdit
secure.(Ibid.)
Morespeci
Ž
cally,asignis‘
apieceofequipmentthatexplicitlyraisesa
totalityofequipmentintocircumspection,sothattogetherwithittheworldly
characteroftheavailableannouncesitself
’.(
SZ
80)
Asignissomethingonticallyavailablethat,asthisde
Ž
niteequipment,alsofunctions
assomethingindicativeoftheontologicalstructureofavailability,ofreferential
totalities,andofworldliness.
Thereinliesthespecialstatusofthisavailablething
withintheenvironmentofcircumspectiveconcern.(
SZ
82)
Signsareequipment,then,buttheyhaveaspecial,privilegedstatusinvirtue
oftheircapacitytoshedlightnotjustonsalientaspectsofpracticalsituations,
butonontologicalstructures,too.Signsbringotherequipment,practical
situations,andevenontologicalphenomenaintoviewexplicitly.Onecould
say,then,thatsignsplayakindoftranscendentalroleinuncoveringthe
underlyingontologicalconditionsforourencounterwiththingsinthe
environment.Perhapswecouldtieourshoesandbrushourteeth,butwe
couldneverdophenomenology,norevennegotiateacrowdedintersection,
withoutthehelpofsigns.
Sofar,sogood.ButLafontinterpretsthetranscendentalstatusofsignsina
farmoreradicalway.Onheraccount,shoelacesandtoothbrushesthemselves
couldneverevenshowupforusasintelligibleequipmentintheabsenceof
signs,sincesignsarethemselvesresponsibleforconstitutingcontextsof
equipmentinthe
Ž
rstplace.LafontsaysthatHeideggertreatssigns‘asa
paradigmaticcase’ofequipment,which‘leadshimtofeeljusti
Ž
edin
generalizingtheresultsoftheanalysis’tohisaccountofthepragmatic
interconnectednessoftheequipmentalcontextatlarge,whichhesays
consistsinakindofteleological‘reference’(
Verweisung
)(p.31).
2
But
Heideggerclearlyregardssignsanexceptionalcase,notexemplaryor
generalizable.
Lafontalsomaintainsthat,forHeidegger,‘the
understanding
ofa
referentialtotality,likeeveryunderstanding,mustbeclari
Ž
edonthebasis
ofthestructureofthesign’(pp.31–32);thatHeideggermakes‘useofthe
208
TaylorCarman
sign-structureforexplainingtheconstitutionoftheworld’(p.37);that‘the
systemofsigns-relations...constitutestheworld’(p.43n40).Butthisisjust
theoppositeofwhatHeideggersays.Whathesaysisthatthestructureofthe
signmustbeclari
Ž
edonthebasisofthefunctioningofequipment,not
vice
versa
,sinceasignjustisapieceofequipment,albeitofaveryspecialkind.
Asheputsthepointinhislecturesof1925,‘
theonticshowing
[ofsigns]
is
groundedinthestructureofreference
’.Thereferenceofsigns,however,‘is
nottheshowing,ratherthelatteristhattowhichthereferencerefers’.So,
‘Justasahammeris
for
hammering,sothesignis
for
showing,butthis
referenceofserviceabilityinthestructureoftheenvironmentalthinghammer
doesnotmakethehammerasign.’
3
Thatis,thepracticalreferringofahammer,thewayit
Ž
tsintoan
equipmentalcontextasawhole,liesnotjustinthehammeringofthehammer,
notjustinitscontactwithahandatoneendandanailattheother,butina
multitudeofequipmentalinterconnections,forinstance,itsplaceonthewall
orinthetoolbox.Sotoo,thereferringofasignliesinthewayit
Ž
tsintoa
practiceasawhole,notjustinitsshowingsomething,say,apathinawood,
oranapproachingstorm.Hammersarehammersandsignsaresignsonlyby
referringintheequipmentalsense,buthammeringandshowingdonot
exhausttheequipmentalreferenceofhammersandsigns.Tryingtoaccount
fortheavailabilityofequipmentatlargeintermsoftheshowingofsigns,
Heideggerseemstobesaying,wouldbeliketryingtoaccountforitinterms
ofhammeringorgluingorpainting.
OnLafont’saccount,bycontrast,signsarenot
basedon
butrather
formthe
basisof
equipmentalreferenceasawhole.Insupportofthismuchstronger
transcendentalreading,shetwicequotesHeidegger’sremarknearthe
beginningof§17that‘being-a-sign-forcanitselfbeformalizedintoa
universalkindofrelation
,sothatthesign-structureitselfprovidesan
ontologicalcluefor“characterizing”allentitiesingeneral’(
SZ
77)(cf.pp.
32,33).Sheseemstotakethiscommentatfacevalue,asifHeideggerwere
endorsingthenotionthatanyandeveryentitycanberegardedasasign,oras
beinguncoveredonlyinvirtueofsigns.
Butinfacttheremarkmeansjusttheopposite.Concerning‘signs’,
Heideggerwrites,‘Manythingsarenamedbythisword:notonlydifferent
kinds
ofsigns,butbeing-a-sign-forcanitselfbeformalizedintoa
universal
kindofrelation
,sothatthesign-structureitselfprovidesanontologicalclue
for“characterizing”allentitiesingeneral’(
SZ
77).Thepointisthatindoing
phenomenologywemustfocusonsomeconcretelyspeci
Ž
edphenomenon,
since,looselyspeaking,anythingandeverythingcanbecalleda‘sign’.Ifwe
arenotcareful,weareliabletomissthephenomenaaltogetherand
Ž
nd
ourselvestalkingabouteverythingandnothing.ThatthisisHeidegger’spoint
becomesobviousifwecomparethepassagein
BeingandTime
withits
textualprecursorinthe1925lectures,whichisworthquotingatlength:
WasHeideggeraLinguisticIdealist?
209
[T]heuniversalscopeofphenomenasuchassignsandsymbolseasilygivesriseto
usingthemasaclueforinterpretingthetotalityofentities,theworldasawhole.No
lessa
Ž
gurethanLeibnizsoughtinhis
characteristicauniversalis
asystematizationof
thetotalityofentitiesintermsofanorientationtothephenomenonofthesign.
RecentlySpengler,followingtheprocedureofLamprecht,haselaboratedtheideaof
thesymbolforthephilosophyofhistoryandmetaphysicsingeneral,withoutoffering
anyproperlyscienti
Ž
cclari
Ž
cationoftherangeofphenomenatherebyindicated.
Finally,inhiswork,
ThePhilosophyofSymbolicForms
,Cassirerhastriedtoexplain
thevariousdomainsoflife–language,knowledge,religion,myth–inafundamental
wayasphenomenaoftheexpressionofspirit.Hehaslikewisesoughttobroadenthe
critiqueofreason
providedbyKantintoa
critiqueofculture.
Here,too,the
phenomenonofexpression,ofsymbolinthewidestsense,istakenasacluefor
explaininghenceforthallphenomenaofspiritandofentitiesingeneral.Theuniversal
applicabilityofsuchformalcluesas‘gestalt’,‘sign’,‘symbol’inthiswayeasily
obscurestheprimordialityornonprimordialityoftheinterpretationtherebyachieved.
Whatmightbeanappropriateapproachforaestheticphenomenacanleadtoprecisely
theoppositeofanelucidationorinterpretationinthecaseofotherphenomena....It
isobviousthatinterpretiveeffortsofthekinddescribed,takingupthecluesofsuch
universalphenomena,ofwhichanythingandeverythingcanbemade–forultimately
anythingandeverythingcanbeinterpretedasasign–poseagreatdangerforthe
developmentofthehumansciences.(
PGZ
,pp.276–8,emphasisadded)
Farfromrepresentinghisownview,then,suchappealstogeneralnotions
suchastheconceptofasignorasymbolbywayofexplainingintelligibility
atlargeareplainlyanathematoHeidegger.Ifthepeculiaritiesofsignsseem
toofferasinglekeywithwhichtounlockthesecretontologicalconstitution
ofentitiesingeneral,weareindangerofignoringthephenomena–
the
‘
thingsthemselves
’–infavorofaprefabricatedinterpretiveschema,precisely
thesortofhermeneuticalcravingforgeneralityandneatnessthatHeideggeris
alwaysatpainstoresistandcondemn.Lafont,itseemstome,hasmisreadthe
textandsuccumbedtotemptationininsistingthat,forHeideggerhimself,‘the
worldas“awholeofsigni
Ž
cance”is...ofasymbolicnature’(48).Atone
pointsheeventreatstheterms‘ontological’and‘symbolical’assynonymous
(p.18n11).Itisnoaccident,Ithink,thatHeideggerneversaysanythinglike
thisin
BeingandTime.
TheconfusioniscompoundedbythecloselinkLafontforgesbetweentwo
termsthatfunctionquiteseparatelyinHeidegger’saccount,namely‘sign’
(
Zeichen
)and‘signify’(
be-deuten
).
4
Theaf
Ž
liationemergestacitlyinsection
1.2.2,andthenexplicitatthebeginningof1.3:
Withhisanalysisofsigns,Heideggerfocusesonandexplainsaparticularkindof
reference,namely‘signifying’.Oncethishasbeendone,hebelievesthathis
interpretationofthesignasanexemplarycaseofequipmentjusti
Ž
eshimin
identifyingthetwoinacertainway.Thereferenceofthesign(andhenceits
‘signifying’)isheldtobeofthesamekindastheteleological‘reference’of
equipmenttothe‘towards-which’ofits‘serviceability’,theverypointfromwhichthe
analysisofequipmentbegan.(p.40)
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